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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACCEPTANCES COMMUNICATED BY 
ELECTRONIC MEANS, OR – DOES THE POSTAL ACCEPTANCE 
RULE APPLY TO EMAIL?  
 
Eliza Mik, PhD LLM (Sydney) 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The initial fascination with “everything Internet” and the persistent trend to equip otherwise unexciting 
legal terms with the prefixes “cyber-“ or “e-“ seem to have abated. Despite nearly 15 years of electronic 
commerce and endless articles revolving around the legal changes and challenges allegedly brought about 
by the Internet, many important questions remain open. One of those questions relates to the seemingly 
basic problem lying at the centre of contract formation: when does an acceptance communicated by 
electronic means become effective? To date, legal literature has not been able to provide a definitive 
answer. Existing analyses appear simplistic and based on a general lack of understanding of the 
underlying technologies. It is surprising that electronic commerce managed to thrive despite the lack of 
certainty and predictability in such an important issue.  
 
This paper analyses the problem of determining the time of formation on the basis of the “offer 
and acceptance” model. The latter comprises interpretative rules to determine when the minds of the 
parties have met.1 Although harnessing a sequence of electronic acts into “offers” and “acceptances” may 
appear artificial,2 only the offer-acceptance analysis permits the establishment of the precise moment of 
formation. While acknowledging the fact that contracts can come into being without a discernible “offer 
and acceptance” being present,3 this paper focuses on the difficulties of applying the offer and acceptance 
model to novel communication scenarios. The aim is not to provide a definitive solution regarding the 
moment of effectiveness of acceptances communicated by electronic means. The aim is to explore the 
inconsistencies in popular arguments, the blind alleys they lead to and the problems created by an 
                                                
1 Carter, J W, Carter on Contract, vol 1, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, Sydney 2002, hereinafter referred to as  Carter on 
Contract; at  [02-050]; Hyatt Australia Ltd v LTCB Australia Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 260 at 264 per McPherson JA; The Law 
of Contract para 2.2 
2 Carter on Contract [03-290] referring to Lord Denning’s suggestion in Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-cell-O Corp 
(England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401 at 405 
3 Carter, J W, Peden, E, Tolhurst, G, Contract Law in Australia, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, Sydney 2007, hereinafter 
referred to as Carter, Peden, Tolhurst; at  [201] 
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undisciplined use of terminology. In particular, the persistent focus on the “instantaneousness” of 
electronic communications is criticized. “Instantaneousness” is a distracting factor and should be 
abandoned from the discussion altogether. A more simplified and technology independent approach is 
proposed.  
 
The effectiveness of an acceptance on receipt is regarded as the principle, while effectiveness on 
dispatch, called the “postal acceptance rule” (the “PAR”), is regarded as the exception. This paper asks 
the question: should acceptances communicated by electronic means be governed by the principle or by 
the exception?  
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Contracts can be formed face-to-face or at a distance. Determining the moment of formation does not 
generally raise problems in face-to-face dealings: one party speaks the other listens, the moment words 
are spoken, the other party hears them.4 Communication is actual and immediate. Acceptance is effective 
the moment it is manifested, there is no distinction between dispatch and receipt, or between receipt and 
notification. In dealings at a distance, the dispatch of acceptance may be distinct from its receipt. The 
delay is the result of spatial remoteness, its length derives from the method of communication. The 
implications of delay are twofold. First, an offer may be revoked until acceptance is received.5 Second, 
both parties remain in a state of uncertainty as neither knows whether and when a contract is formed.6  
 
Dealings at a distance can be subdivided into those occurring with the intermediation of the post 
and those occurring with the intermediation of devices, which render the interaction similar to either 
dealings face-to-face or to dealings occurring through the post. When the post is used, acceptance is 
generally effective upon dispatch of the letter. If dealings are regarded “as if” occurring face-to-face, 
acceptance is effective on receipt. Whenever a specific method or device is used to communicate at a 
distance, attempts are made to place it either in the “postal” or in the “as if face-to-face” category.7   
 
When the existing rules were conceptualised, the methods of communicating at a distance were 
few. Apart from personal delivery or the use of agents, the post was the only viable means of conveying 
acceptance. Distance always implied a delay between dispatch and receipt of the letter. Distance is, 
however, no longer synonymous with delay. Internet-based methods of communication can reduce the 
interval between dispatch and receipt to the point of non-existence. This lack, or brevity, of delay is often 
accompanied by a high risk of non-delivery. Neither the principle, nor the exception, address such 
scenario. A closer look at the existing case law and literature reveals a grey zone created by unforseen 
permutations of old principles and novel communication scenarios.  
 
The judges in the leading cases, Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation8 (“Entores”) and 
Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH9 (“Brinkibon”) did not anticipate that their 
reasoning would form the basis for evaluating the expansion of the PAR to email, instant messengers and 
web-applications. Although these cases are cited in practically all discussions, it is often forgotten, that 
“there is no absolute rule as to the time when an acceptance by fax, telephone or telex takes effect, but 
the question depends in each case on the facts and reasonable expectations of the parties.”10 In his 
                                                
4 A L Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, vol 1 (1993) par 3.25 
5 Carter on Contract [03-150] 
6 Carter, Peden, Tolhurst [3-31] 
7 See Restatement (Second) Contracts, par 64 
8 [1955] 2 QB 327 
9 [1983] 2 AC 34 
10 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42; See also: B Coote, The 
Instantaneous Transmission of Acceptances (1971) 4 NZULR 331  
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famous speech, Lord Wilberforce stated that cases must be resolved “by reference to the intention of the 
parties, by sound business practice and … by a judgement where the risks should lie.”11  
 
The principle of receipt derives from face-to-face dealings, whereas the exception developed 
around the post.12 Two assumptions flow from this statement: first, a principle that originated from a 
perfect communication scenario cannot be automatically applied to govern scenarios, which are “less 
perfect”; second, the PAR was conceived to accommodate a specific method of communication. 
 
 
ROADMAP 
 
This paper starts with a comprehensive recount of the basic rules pertaining to the time of contract 
formation.  The principle and the concepts used in its formulation are described, the tension between the 
“meeting of minds” and the objective theory of contract as well as the division between dealings at a 
distance and face-to-face are explained. Subsequently, the exception is presented.   
 
Determining the time of formation with regards to contracts concluded via the Internet is usually 
presented in the form of the question “does the PAR apply to email?” Such inquiry is based on reverse 
reasoning: “should the exception govern electronic acceptances?” instead of “should the principle apply?” 
Arguably, only the first question merits attention as the principle applies by default. While it appears more 
appropriate to examine effectiveness in relation to the principle, not the exception, the “traditional” line of 
reasoning is followed and the popular arguments against the application of the PAR to email are tested. 
After analysing the technical assumptions underlying most arguments, some novel elements are 
introduced into the discussion.  
 
Next, it is examined whether emailed acceptances “fit” under the principle. The focus is on the 
characteristics of face-to-face dealings. The discussion centres around email as to-date legal analysis has 
focused almost exclusively on this method. Email also constitutes a useful point of comparison with other 
Internet-based communication methods, such as instant messengers and web-based interactions.13  
 
 
CAVEATS AND CLARIFICATIONS 
 
The moment of effectiveness depends on the intention of the parties. Absent a definite indication of 
intention, it remains unclear what factors should be taken into account when choosing between 
effectiveness on receipt and effectiveness on dispatch. The question “what are the criteria for deciding 
when an acceptance communicated by electronic means should become effective?” remains unanswered. 
At the same time, the once popular subject of “email and the postal acceptance rule” seems to have 
disappeared from the radar – leaving the problem of effectiveness unsolved. It is time to close this 
chapter. 
 
Demise or  rev iva l?  
 
Admittedly, in light of the novel communication landscape, the PAR should be facing its demise. If the PAR 
developed around the post, why even consider its application on-line? Upon closer examination, it turns 
out that the PAR may be facing its revival in relation to some novel methods of communication. It cannot 
                                                
11 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42   
12 P Goodrich, The Posthumous Life of the Postal Acceptance Rule (2005) Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law, Working 
Paper No 127 p 8 
13 see also: W A Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform 
Commercial Code (1997) 34 San Diego L Rev 1263 at 1281 
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be discarded solely on the ground that everything on the Internet “happens fast:” as messages are 
transmitted in the form of electrical impulses and not carried by trucks over bumpy roads, the contract 
formation process is accelerated. Contrary to popular belief, however, this paper demonstrates that speed 
of transmission alone is not decisive. The simplistic (yet predominant) view that the PAR relates to non-
instantaneous methods of communication disregards the historical background of the rule and provides no 
guidance as to its potential application.  
 
Iso lat ing the problem 
 
Ascertaining the exact moment of contract formation necessitates two separate investigations: when does 
acceptance become effective, and when do “dispatch” and “receipt” occur. The focus of this paper is on 
“effectiveness” only. It does not attempt to define either “dispatch” or “receipt” but to establish which of 
these two events is relevant in the first place. This somewhat surprising separation is dictated by the 
necessity to isolate certain problems. The effectiveness of electronic acceptances raises different 
questions than the definition of “dispatch” or “receipt.” “Effectiveness” involves a search for 
distinguishing criteria between different methods of communicating intention, “dispatch” and “receipt” 
require a fine-grained analysis of the network infrastructure, including a search for a point of risk transfer. 
Accordingly, any analysis of on-line contract formation warrants two separate investigations: “when does 
an acceptance become effective – upon dispatch or upon receipt?” and “when does dispatch and receipt 
occur?” The answer to the second question is relegated to a separate paper. 
 
Importance of  problem  
 
Determining the time of formation has important implications. All on-line contracts are formed at a 
distance, with the parties often being in two different jurisdictions. Absent agreement, the time of 
formation may determine the applicable law, including its implied terms. As the place of formation 
depends on the place acceptance became effective, establishing where? must be preceded by establishing 
when?14 The moment of formation also affects the contents of the contract.15 It determines such contents 
“according to what the offeree knew or had notice of at the time of sending the letter of acceptance.”16 If 
one of the parties attempts to incorporate his terms, those terms must generally be brought to the notice 
of the other party before the final act concluding the contract. Similarly, statements made during the 
formation process may become part of the contract as representations or warranties. In both instances, 
acceptance is the final cut-off point for establishing the contractual obligations of the parties.  
 
The model  laws are  s i lent   
 
None of the model laws or conventions designed to facilitate electronic contracting contains substantive 
rules governing the time of formation. Interestingly, all of them focus on defining “dispatch” and 
“receipt”17 – not on whether acceptances become effective on dispatch or receipt…  
 
                                                
14 J Hogan-Doran, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: the When and Where of On-line Contracts (2003) 77 ALJ 377 
15 J C Dodd, Time and Assent in the Formation of Information Contracts: the Mischief of Applying Article 2 to 
Information Contracts (1999) 36 Hous L Rev 195 at 201 
16 P Goodrich, above at note 12 p 15 
17 see e.g UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996) with additional article 5 bis 
as adopted in 1998, Art. 15 
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DISSECTING THE PRINCIPLE 
 
The principle can be formulated as follows: “acceptance must be communicated.”18 “Communication” can 
be tied to a number of events and does not indicate the specific moment that concludes the formation 
process.19 Its definition depends on how far one departs from the classic “meeting of minds” and how 
much focus is placed on the objective theory of contract. On one hand, agreement is reached when the 
offeror knows that the offer has been accepted.20 On the other, offerees may not be able to ensure 
anything beyond the receipt of the letter and acceptance must be tied to an objectively ascertainable 
event. As the principle has always been approached in an intuitive fashion, rather than based on 
consistent criteria, it proves difficult to transplant onto novel communication scenarios. 
 
In dealings at a distance, communication need not be actual, it suffices that the offeree enables 
the offeror to take cognisance of acceptance, such as by delivering it to his address or telex machine, even 
if the latter are unattended.21 The requirement to communicate acceptance is therefore not absolute.22 
Communication is actual and immediate only in face-to-face dealings. While textbooks state that 
acceptance must be communicated, it is common to refer to the principle of receipt. The principle appears 
more intuitive but is also more difficult to formulate in light of the objective theory of contract. A closer 
look is taken at its constituent parts.  
 
“Communicat ion”  
 
“Communication” is the process of conveying information, especially by electronic or mechanical means, 
and the act of transmitting information by telephone, radio, etc.23 “Communication” can therefore denote 
notification or transmission. This distinction gains importance when comparing dealings at a distance with 
dealings face-to-face. “Communication“ is traditionally associated with “receipt.” “Receipt” can imply 
knowledge (bringing the fact of acceptance to the offeror’s mind)24 or the end of transmission (arrival at a 
machine).25 Hereinafter, when italicised, the term communication means notification. 
 
“Means,”  “method” and “medium” 
 
“Medium” indicates an intervening substance through which an effect is produced or the channel of 
communication, such as speech or writing.26 “Medium” can also be a means of conveying information, a 
carrier of information, like paper or electric impulses. “Method” is described as a mode of procedure.27 In 
common parlance “medium” and “method” are synonymous with “means” and are also used 
interchangeably with “device.”  
 
                                                
18 Carter on Contract [03-310] 
19 see: P H Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance (1939) 55 LQR 499 at 506 for a review of different 
systems of determining the moment of formation 
20 Carter on Contract [03-310]; P Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule (1996) 17 Cardozo L Rev 1457 at 1463 
21 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42; Entores Ltd v Miles Far East 
Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 331; Shelde Delta Shipping BV v Astarte Shipping Ltd (The Pamela) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 249; Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v The Brimnes (Owners) [1975] QB 929; Anson v Trump [1998] 1 WLR 1404  
22 Carter on Contract [03-310]; it is unclear whether “actual communication” requires that acceptance is brought to 
the offeror’s mind, see: Bressan v Squires [1974] 2 NSWLR 460, at 461 
23 Macquarie Dictionary, 2003  (online edition) 
24 Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes [1974] 1 All ER 161 at 164; Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256, at 256, 
269; Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR 93; Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v 
The Brimnes (Owners) [1975] Q B 929 at 970 
25 Shelde Delta Shipping BV v Astarte Shipping Ltd (The Pamela) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249; Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v 
The Brimnes (Owners) [1975] QB 929 
26 Macquarie Dictionary 
27 Macquarie Dictionary 
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Although used interchangeably, the above terms refer to different things. When the post is used, 
the letter is the physical carrier, the medium. The post is the method of transmission, there is no 
intermediating device. In the case of electronic messages the carrier of information are copper or fibre 
optic wires, the means, or devices, are various intermediating and terminating network elements. The 
method can be described as one of the communication services like email, instant messengers or web-
based communications. To add confusion, the Internet itself is often described as a medium. Hereinafter, 
“method” is used in its widest sense, without reference to any particular carrier, device or protocol.  
 
“At  a  d istance” and “face-to-face” 
 
Surprisingly, the distinction between dealings “face-to-face” and “at a distance” is not clear. How far 
apart should parties be to remain “at a distance”? Is “distance” synonymous with “absence”? The 
“shouting across the river with planes passing overhead” example, crucial to Lord Denning’s reasoning in 
Entores illustrates the difficulty of drawing the above distinction.28 His Lordship described the situation as 
parties making a contract in the presence of each other.29 How wide was the river? Not wide enough to 
prevent the parties from hearing each other and perceiving each other’s presence. It can be assumed that 
distance turns into absence when the parties can no longer monitor the success of the communication 
process and require devices to enable communication. It could also be claimed that absence requires not 
only a spatial but also a temporal separation. This lack of a clear-cut distinction becomes important when 
comparing dealings at a distance with those occurring face-to-face. Common sense dictates that there are 
only two types of dealings: those at distance and those occurring face-to-face, with no intermediate 
“grades” of presence or absence. 
 
 
THE EXCEPTION 
 
When acceptance is communicated through the post, it becomes effective when the letter is posted.30 A 
contract is formed even though the letter is delayed, lost and never delivered.31 For the PAR to apply the 
letter must be properly addressed and deposited.32 Effectiveness on dispatch does not depend on 
subsequent successful delivery,33 the PAR does not have a retrospective effect from the moment of receipt 
to the moment of dispatch.34 Dispatch need not occur at a time that would enable the letter to be received 
before expiry of the offer.35 Accordingly, when the PAR applies any occurrences after dispatch, including 
receipt itself, are irrelevant. The application of the PAR is, however, confined by the construction of the 
offer: it cannot lead to absurd results or where the requirement of actual communication must be 
presumed.36  
 
                                                
28 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 332 
29 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 332 
30 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27 at 33; Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381 at 409 
31 Carter, Peden, Tolhurst [3-30] 
32 Re London and Northern Bank: Ex parte Jones [1900] 1 Ch 220; In re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles, Townsend’s 
Case (1871) LR 13 Eq 148 at 150. In the United States, depositing a letter with prepaid postage with the post office 
raises a presumption that it reached its destination, see: In re Cameron Estate 130 A 2d 173, 177 (Pa 1957). In 
England and Australia such presumption is absent.    
33 In re Imperial Land Company of Marseilles (Harris’ Case) (1872) 7 Ch App 587 at 592, 597; Household Fire and 
Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 223 
34 In re Imperial Land Company of Marseilles (Harris’ Case) (1872) 7 Ch App 587 at 592; Potter v Sanders (1846) 6 
Hare 1 
35 for opposite approach see: Equity Fire & Casualty Co v Traver 330 Ark 102, 953 SW 2d 565 (1997) 
36 Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan’s Merchandise (Vic) Pty Ltd (1957) 98 CLR at 93, 111-112; Holwell Securities Ltd v 
Hughes [1974] 1 All ER 161; Nunin Holdings Pty Ltd v Tullamarine Estates Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 74; see also Corbin on 
Contracts, vol. 1 (1993), par. 3.24, p. 443 
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It is unclear whether it is the post or the letter that invoke the exception. The letter is the physical 
carrier, or medium, the post is the method of transmission and delivery. The PAR does not apply when 
letters are delivered in person or by courier,37 or when parties exchange letters face-to-face. Assumedly, it 
is not the letter but the post that invokes the exception. At the same time, in the early days not just 
telexes and telegrams but also telephones were in the domain of the post office. Yet, no attempt was 
made to extend the PAR on the basis of postal intermediation...38 
 
Effectiveness on dispatch can also be regarded as a derivative of distance and the resulting 
delay. Consequently, the PAR could be considered whenever parties a) deal at a distance and b) use a 
method that involves an interval between dispatch and receipt. It must not be forgotten that when the PAR 
was first conceptualised, distance always implied delay. There was also a direct relationship between the 
two factors: the greater the distance, the longer the delay. 
 
The PAR continues to generate academic debate and criticism. Admittedly, it is only in the area of 
its potential adoption to “more recent technologies where justifications for the rule retain their 
importance.”39 It was also observed that “the postal exception may well be more significant than the 
standard rule.”40 Despite being the exception, the PAR forms the basis of most analyses regarding the 
effectiveness of electronic acceptances. The PAR was applied to telegraph,41 but not to telephone,42 telex43 
or facsimile.44 Allegedly, “this reluctance to extend the rule any further … is proof that the law recognises 
what a radical departure from the fundamental principles of contract law this rule is.”45 It must be noted, 
that in the US - the biggest e-commerce economy46 - the PAR applies in situations that in Australia are 
governed by the principle of receipt.47  
 
                                                
37 But see: Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 237 
38 P H Winfield, above at note 19 p 14 
39 P Goodrich, above at note 20 at 1462 
40 C Douzinas, R Warrington, Posting the Law: Social Contracts and the Postal Rule’s Grammatology (1991) 4 Int’l J 
for Semiotics Law 115 at 123-125 
41 Cowan v O’Conner (1888) 20 QBD 640 at 642. PAR also extended to telegram, with little analysis in Island 
Properties Ltd v Entertainment Enterprises Ltd (1983) 146 DLR (3d) 505 (Nfld TD); Bruner v Moore [1904] 1 Ch 305; 
Re Viscount Supply Co (1963) 40 DLR (2d) 501 (Ont SC) at 505 
42 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327; Aviet v Smith and Searls Pty Ltd (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 
274 
43 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327; Express Airways v Port Augusta Air Service (1980) Qd R 
543; Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 
44 Reese Bros Plastics Ltd v Hamon-Sabelco Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 5 PBR 97325 (NSW CA), Egis Consulting Australia 
Pty Ltd v First Dynasty Mines Ltd (A Company incorporated in Canada) [2001] WASC 22; Eastern Power v Azienda 
Communale Energia & Ambiente (1999) 178 DLR (4th) 409 (Ont CA); Molodyski v Vema Australia Ltd (1989) NSW 
Conv R 55-446; Twynham Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Anburn Pty Ltd unreported SC NSW 15 Aug 1989 
45 S Hill, Flogging A Dead Horse – The Postal Acceptance Rule and Email (2001) 17 JCL 2 at 14 
46 R Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues (1996) 14 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 211 at 222 
47 A L Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1993) vol 1, par 3.25  
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JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
Textbook explanations of the PAR are often “straightforwardly cynical in tenor.”48 The PAR is based on 
convenience,49 the provision of a sense of finality50 or simply regarded as arbitrary.51 It avoids an endless 
exchange of confirmations of receipt 52 and concludes the contract at the earliest possible moment.53 
Historically, the justifications of the PAR have varied: the post office has been regarded as the common 
agent of the parties54 or the appointed agent of the offeror.55 Communicating acceptance to the post 
equated communication to the offeror.56 The latter argument was replaced with the view that the post is 
only a carrier of letters.57 Another justification was the fiction of continuing assent58 but this view has long 
been abandoned.59  
 
Most explanations of the PAR combine choice, control and risk allocation:  the offeror (who is the 
addressee of the acceptance) chose the post and should therefore bear the resulting risks.60 He could have 
protected himself by stating that acceptance is effective upon communication.61 Furthermore, the offeree 
(who is the sender of the acceptance) has done all he can by posting the acceptance as instructed.62 
Posting is regarded as the decisive moment because the offeree has put the letter out of his control and 
done an extraneous act, which shows that each side is bound.63 Another explanation is the protection of 
the offeree: the PAR terminates the offeror’s power to revoke upon the occurrence of an event under the 
offeree’s control,64 effectively extending the duration of the offer.65 
                                                
48 P Goodrich, above at note 20 p 1464 
49 K N Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance II (1939) 48 Yale L.J 779 at 792-798; but see D H 
Evans, The Anglo-American Mailing Rule: Some Problems of Offer and Acceptance in Contracts by Correspondence 
(1966) 15 ICLQ 553 at 556-561, who cites 11 reasons for the rule. 
50 Adams v Lindsell (1818) B & Ald 681 at 683 
51 A L Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1993) vol. 1, par. 3.24; S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 4th ed., by R 
Lord, vol 2, 1991, par 6:34  
52 Adam v Lindsell (1818) B & Ald 681 
53 Carter on Contract [03-390] 
54 Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381; Wright v Bigg (1852) 15 Beav 592 
55 Byrne v Leon van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344 
56 Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381; Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 
216 at 221 
57 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27 at 35-36 
58 Cooke v Oxley (1790) 3 Times Reports 653  
59 J M Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation (2000) 69 Fordham L Rev 
427 at 440 
60 Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381 at 398  
61 A H Hudson, Retraction of Letters of Acceptance (1966) 82 LQR at 170  
62 Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381 at 398; In Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles (Wall’s case) (1872) LR 15 Eq 18 at 
25 
63 Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666, at 669, 691. The assumption that a letter can be 
retracted formed the basis for dispensing with the mailbox rule in two controversial US Court of Claims cases. See 
Rhode Island Tool Co v United States, 128 F Supp 417 (Ct Cl 1955); Dick v United States, 82 F Supp 326 (Ct Cl 1949). 
These cases have not been followed. It is now generally accepted that the possibility of withdrawal alone is not a 
sufficient basis for dispensing with the PAR. See: P Fasciano, Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the 
Mailbox Rule (1997) 25 Hofstra L Rev 971 at 982; see also: C L Pannam, Postal regulation 289 and Acceptance of an 
Offer by Post (1960) 2 MULR 388. In Morrison v Thoelke 155 So 2d 889, 905 (Fla Dist Ct App 1963) it was stated 
that the change in postal regulations allowing withdrawal of a letter is an insufficient basis for dispensing with the 
mailbox rule. The issue is of little relevance for electronic communications since they cannot be retracted. 
64 Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 220; Re Imperial Land Co of 
Marseilles (Harris’ Case) (1872) LR Ch Ap 587, at 594; for an interesting explanation of the historical origins of the 
PAR see: P Goodrich, above note 12, who traces the rule to ecclesiastical law and the protection of the female 
offeree. 
65 R Craswell, Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 481 at 519 
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The PAR also places the risk of transmission and receipt on the addressee. Once the letter is 
dispatched, the sender is “not answerable for casualties occurring at the post-office.”66 Logically, if control 
ceases, risk should cease.67 The risk borne by the offeror is small: he trusts a method, which in principle 
does not fail.68 Historically, posting was equated with certainty of delivery based on the reliability of the 
post.69  
 
Two observations come to mind.  First, effectiveness on dispatch can hardly be regarded as an 
arbitrary choice: dispatch is the first objective manifestation of intention by the offeree. It is therefore fair 
to ascribe legal meaning to this particular event.70 Second, due to the difficulty in formulating the principle, 
the PAR may not be an exception to the principle of communication but only to the requirement of 
receipt.71 Due to the reliability of the post, the PAR assumes that the letter will be received and its 
contents communicated.72 Without delving into the numerous criticisms of the PAR, which are described 
elsewhere,73 some arguments are made upfront. General criticism must be distinguished from arguments 
against the PAR’s extension to electronic acceptances.  
 
Offeree protect ion? 
 
Protection against revocation cannot be used as an argument against the PAR’s potential applicability to 
electronic acceptances. Unquestionably, the offeree can protect himself by purchasing an option.74 At the 
same time, it can be the offeree who chose the method of acceptance and controls the communication 
process.75 The roles of offeror and offeree are often difficult to discern and arbitrary.76 Protection is 
unwarranted if the offeree retains mastery of the offer. It not necessarily the offeree who requires 
protection and the event one must be protected against is not necessarily revocation.77 As discussed 
below, it is not the risk of revocation but the risk of failed receipt that gains prominence in electronic 
communications. Whenever one party chose the method of acceptance, the other deserves protection 
against the risks inherent in that method.  
                                                
66 In Re Imperial Land Co of Marseilles; Townsend’s Case (1871) LR 13 Eq 148, at 150; see also Dunlop v Higgins 
(1848) HLC 381 
67 Dunlop v Higgins (1848) HLC 381 at 398 
68 Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 223 
69 Stidolph v American School in London Educational Trust Ltd (1969) 20 P & C R 802 at 805; S Gardner, Trashing with 
Trollope: A Deconstruction of the Postal Rules in Contract (1992) 12 Oxford J of Legal Stud 170 at 184; see also: I R 
Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule (1964) 112 U Penn LR 947 at 958 speaking of 
likelihood of receipt; see also: Morrison v Thoelke 155 So 2d 889 (Fla App D2 1963), “…delay or misdirection of a 
letter of acceptance is beyond the realm of possibility.” 
70 R A Samek, A Reassessment of the Present Rule Relating to Postal Acceptance (1961) 35 ALJ 38 at 40 
71 B Coote, above at note 10 p 337; nothing in the wording of Adams v Lindsell (1818) B & Ald 681 suggests that the 
PAR is an exception or derogation. 
72 Williston, S, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 4th ed, ed Lord, R A, Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, New     York, 
1991; par 6:32  
73 Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 235 by Bramwell J; P 
Goodrich, above at note 21 at 1473 
74 B Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation By Promise and the Need for Revision of the Mailbox Rule (1991) 79 
Ky L J 557 at 566 
75 G. Treitel, The Law of Contract, London 2003, p 25 
76 W A Dewhurst & Co Pty Ltd v Cawrse [1960] VR 278 at 284; see also: M Yamaguchi, The Problem of Delay in the 
Contract Formation Process: A Comparative Study of Contract Law (2004) 37 Cornell Int’l L J 357 for a description of 
the implications of each position. 
77 P Goodrich, above at note 12 p 15 
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Intent ion? 
 
The time of formation depends on the intention of the parties, in particular, on the construction of the 
offer.78 The search is, however, for a default rule - absent clear intention.79 The only objective indication of 
intention is the choice of communication method. Arguments that the offeror could have protected himself 
by requiring actual communication80 are therefore futile. They assume the offeror’s knowledge that a given 
method invokes the PAR.81 The PAR, however, applies where the post is “contemplated.”82 It applies 
because the post is used, not because effectiveness on dispatch is intended.83 It is questionable whether 
the offeror would have chosen the post if had he realized the implications of such choice. Most 
importantly, intention cannot be imputed if the method of acceptance is imposed.  
 
Neither offeree protection nor intention, constitute decisive criteria for applying or rejecting the PAR.  
 
Technical  Considerat ions 
 
The search for answers must begin with establishing the technological factors (if any) that merit attention 
and should be included in the discussion. Such factors should withhold technological change to avoid re-
examining problems of effectiveness whenever a new communication method is introduced. Factors that 
refer to the physical transmission itself and remain transparent to the parties must be distinguished from 
those, which directly affect the communication process. The impatient reader might ask: why include 
technological factors in a legal discussion? There are two reasons. First, most writers do not. This results 
from a fear of technology or a simple refusal to acknowledge that technological change might affect the 
application of legal principles. Second, many writers do – without, however, understanding the technology 
involved. This often leads to legal arguments based on incorrect technical premises.  
 
To start with a popular misunderstanding: the Internet is not a technology, medium or means. The 
Internet constitutes a general-purpose infrastructure that permits applications on an arbitrary pair of 
computers to exchange information.84  It is unified by a set of core protocols: the TCP/IP protocol stack.85 
TCP/IP provides a range of functions: from application-specific, like email and web-browsing, down to low-
level networking protocols like IP and TCP.86 The TCP/IP suite consists of five layers: application, transport, 
network, data link and physical. Each layer solves a set of problems involving data transmission and 
provides pre-defined services to the upper layer based on services from the lower layers. Upper layers are 
logically closer to the user and deal with more abstract data, relying on lower layer protocols to translate 
data into forms that can be physically transmitted.87 The top layer conveys information in the form of 
words, the lowest layer conveys electrical impulses. 
                                                
78 Carter & Harland [231] 
79 M A Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance (1994) 82 Cal L Rev 1127 
80 A H Hudson, above at note 61 at 172 
81 Carter on Contract [03-360] 
82 Furmston, M P, ed., The Law of Contract, Butterworths, London 1999;  par 2.230; Household Fire and Carriage 
Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 217, 227 
83 Bressan v Squires [1974] 2 NSWLR 460  
84 D E Comer, Computer Networks and Internets with Internet Applications, 4th ed, New Jersey 2004, p 421 
85 For general descriptions see: C Hunt, TCP/IP Network Administration, 3rd ed, Sebastopol, 2002; L B Solum, M 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law (2004 ) 79 Notre Dame L Rev 815; D Benoliel, 
Cyberspace Technological Standardization: An Institutional Theory Retrospective (2003) 18 Berkeley Tech L J 1259 
at 1276. The TCP/IP protocol stack is often compared to the Open System Interconnect (“OSI”) model, which was 
developed by the ISO and serves as a conceptual framework used to compare different networking protocols. 
86 TCP stands for Transmission Control Protocol, whereas IP stands for Internet Protocol. See also: M Froomkin, 
Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 Harv L Rev 749 at 779 
87 Additional layers are often singled out for analytical purposes, for example a user- or content-layer; see: E J Feigin, 
Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and Their Legal Implications (2004) 56 Stan L Rev 901 at 904; M Cooper, 
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From a contract law perspective, all relevant technologies are located at the application layer.88 
Contractual intention is manifested by email, websites or instant messengers.89 It is those individual 
applications that determine the manner information is communicated (i.e. displayed and transmitted).90 
Although the “data link,” “network” and “transport” layers form the core infrastructure, they remain 
“network or system-oriented (rather than user-oriented).”91 They deal exclusively with the physical 
transmission of electrical impulses and packets. To claim that that the bearer network or physical 
transmission channel affects the application of contract formation principles would imply the need to 
differentiate between fixed-line and mobile phones, between letters carried by railway, car or submarine. 
Questions regarding transmission technologies are relegated to telecommunications law and the 
regulatory aspects of the Internet.92 The time of formation does not depend on cables, routers or switches. 
 
Despite the above, some legal arguments refer to factors from the lower layers of the TCP/IP 
stack. For example, it is often stated that email travels in packets.93 So do all other messages on the 
Internet. The Internet is a packet-switched network and the disassembly of the payload into packets at the 
transport layer is its inherent characteristic. Email, instant messengers and web-based interactions 
provide different communication possibilities, which are unrelated to the manner of transmission. 
Depending on which layer of the TCP/IP stack is examined, messages take the form of text, strings of 1s 
and 0s or electrical impulses. Legal arguments cannot be constructed on the basis of an arbitrary selection 
of technical features, which are either layer-specific or apply to all Internet-based communications. To the 
contracting parties, packets are transparent and have no impact on the communication process. 
Arguments that email is instantaneous because it travels in packets are inherently absurd and must be 
rejected.   
 
Communicat ion devices 
 
It can also be assumed that the terminating devices (such as phones, faxes or computers) cannot form a 
criterion in deciding between the principle and the exception. This is so despite the traditional equation 
between telephone conversations and face-to-face dealings. First, one communication process can 
combine multiple devices: a message may originate on the phone and terminate on a fax machine. The 
originating device may differ from the terminating device.94 Which side of the transaction would be 
decisive: the sender’s or the addressee’s? Second, due to a growing trend for convergence, a single device 
can combine multiples functionalities. The distinction between phones and computers is blurred: most 
mobile phones carry the computing power of early computers. Telephone calls can originate on computers 
and terminate on fixed or mobile phones, email and instant messengers can be sent and received from 
mobile phones. Computers are phones and phones are computers. It is therefore impossible to chose 
between the principle and the exception on the basis of the communication device alone. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Open Communications Platforms: the Infrastructure as the Bedrock of Innovation and Democratic Discourse in the 
Internet Age (2003) 2 J Telecomm & High Tech L 177 at 182 
88 Wu, T, Application-Centered Internet Analysis (1999) 85 Va L Rev 1163  at 1163 
89 K C Laudon, C G Traver, above at note 6 p 118 
90 D E Comer, above at note 84, p 422 
91 D Benoliel, above at note 85, p 1278 
92 For a detailed discussion of the various interactions between law and the respective layers see: L B Solum, M 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law (2004) 79 Notre Dame L Rev 815  
93 V Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law “Mailbox Rule” (2004) 56 Baylor L Rev 175  
at 200 
94 See: Express Airways v Port Augusta Air Services [1980] QdR 543, where the acceptance was sent by telegram to 
the Post Office and then via telex to the offeror; Douglas J held, without a detailed explanation, that acceptance 
was effective on receipt; see also Leach Nominees Pty Ltd v Walter Wright Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 244 at 431 for 
explanation of possible combinations of telex, telegram and telephone. 
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Method and Protocol   
 
The characteristics of any communication method depend on its underlying protocol(s). The relationship 
between “method” and “protocol” is not straightforward. It illustrates the difficulty in correlating one 
factor (e.g. technology) to another (e.g. characteristics of the communications process). Email, Instant 
Messengers and web-based communications can be regarded as “methods,” whereas SMTP,95 OSCAR,96 
XMPP97 and HTTP98 are protocols. Each communication method relies on one or more protocols: Internet 
email uses SMTP, web-based communications are based on HTTP. Instant messengers lack a single 
standardized protocol, but share common features and provide an identical communication process. 
Multiple protocol combinations are possible: email may use HTTP, web form input can be transmitted via 
HTTP or SMTP. Different protocols can yield a similar type of communication and some methods deploy 
protocols underlying other methods. Accordingly, there is no strict correlation between a given method and 
a protocol. Protocols remain concealed to the user, whereas the method is chosen depending on the 
specific communication goal, including the urgency of reply or the ability to reach the other party in real-
time.  Protocols must be examined only to the extent they determine the characteristics of the respective 
methods in casu.  
 
In sum, the time of formation cannot depend on the medium of transmission, the protocol or the 
communication devices. These factors are transparent, unpredictable or purely random. Senders have no 
control over how their messages are transmitted and received. Addressees do not know how a message 
originated. The transfer of an acceptance may involve multiple devices, protocols, connection types and 
transmission media. None is decisive in choosing between the principle and the exception.  
 
 
DOES THE PAR APPLY TO EMAIL? 
 
Arguments against extending the PAR to electronic acceptances are usually based on two factors: 
“instantaneousness” and “control.” It is commonly stated that the receipt rule applies to “instantaneous” 
methods of communication, the PAR, where acceptance is communicated by a “non-instantaneous” 
method.99 Control relates to the sender’s ability to ensure receipt, which in turn is associated with 
knowledge of successful or failed receipt. Following the traditional line of reasoning, the question “does 
the PAR apply to email?” requires the examination (a) whether email is instantaneous and (b) whether the 
sender has control of the communication process.  
 
                                                
95 RFC 2821, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (2001) J Klensin, ed 
96 OSCAR is AOL's flagship instant messaging and presence information protocol standing for Open System for 
CommunicAtion in Realtime. Currently in use in two instant messaging systems: ICQ and AIM 
97 RFC 3920, Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (2004), P Saint-Andre, ed 
98 RFC 2621,  Hypertext Transfer Protocol-HTTP/1.1 (1999), T Berners-Lee, et al 
99 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 327, Brinkibon v Stahag und 
Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 41; Fasciano, above at note 63 at 986; See also; Eisler, 
above at note 74 at 583; Farnsworth. 
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Being “ instantaneous” 
 
The term is used with little precision: email is called “absolutely,”100 “not completely,”101 “nearly,”102 
“almost,”103 “virtually,”104 “more or less”105 or “in fact”106 instantaneous. Only few commentators suggest 
that email is not instantaneous.107 As “instantaneousness” allegedly justifies the rejection of the PAR, a 
more consistent meaning is desirable.108   
 
Is “instantaneous” a legal or a technical term? A legal definition permits a liberal approach and 
an adaptation of the term for the purposes of a given argument.109 A technical approach forces a more 
disciplined analysis. Interestingly, even if a purely “legal” definition is adopted, instantaneousness 
remains a question of fact. Moreover, despite the saliency of the term, it is not clear what 
instantaneousness refers to – the method (means? medium?) of communication or the communication 
process itself. This confusion is also reflected in Brinkibon and Entores, where the term is used 
alternatively in reference to the communication process and to the devices used by the parties.110 
 
Strictly speaking, instantaneous means “occurring with no delay.”111 Another definition states: 
“occurring, done or completed in an instant.”112 “Delay” and “instantaneousness” are different sides of the 
same coin: if something is instantaneous there is, logically, no delay. Qualifiers like “virtually,” “almost” or 
“more or less” permit the existence of some delay. How much delay is tolerable for something to remain 
instantaneous? The delay between dispatch and receipt comes in varying degrees. It ranges from days, in 
the case of horse-carts, to microseconds in the case of some electronic communications. Premising the 
PAR exclusively on the length of delay necessitates a gradation: if the delay is longer than “x” (seconds? 
minutes?) acceptance is effective on dispatch, otherwise acceptance is effective on receipt. Arguments 
built around “instantaneousness” lead into a blind alley because they premise effectiveness on a factor 
that is difficult to quantify and often unpredictable. Speed alone cannot form a decisive criterion for 
applying or rejecting the PAR. 
 
                                                
100 K B Norman, The ASB Home Page: Alabama Lawyers Go On-Line for a Wealth of Information (1996) 57 Ala Law 
328 
101 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 337 
102 M R Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace (1996) 29 Vand J Transnat’l 
L 79 
103 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 328; C L Counts, C A Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A 
Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier (1996) 59 Alb L Rev 1083 at 1086   
104 Carter & Harland [232]  
105 Carter on Contract [03-360] [03-390] 
106 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at [ ] 
107 Fasciano above at note 63 at 973; D Capps, Electronic Mail and the Postal Rule (2004) (7) ICCLR 15 , 207-212 at 
208; V Watnick, above at note 93 at 182; Davis, J L R, ed, Contract: General Principles, Thomson Lawbook, Sydney 
2006 at 102  
108 Fasciano, above at note 63 at 1000 
109 S Hill, above at note 45 at 24; Wilmot, L, Christensen, Sh, Butler, D, Contract Law, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne 2005 par [3.475], stating that certain methods will be regarded as instantaneous communication for the 
purposes of contract formation. 
110 See: Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 327 per Lord Denning and [ ] per Lord Parker;  
Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 41, 42 per Lord Wilberfoce 
111 WordNet ® 2.0 (2003) Princeton University 
112 Macquarie Online Dictionary 
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A technical  analysis  
 
Technically, email is an asynchronous, non-real-time, delayed access, store-and-forward method of 
communication.113 Email messages are exchanged independently of each other, without establishing a 
simultaneously contiguous end-to-end traffic path between the contracting parties. Email systems 
comprise mail-clients, which are the originators and final destinations for messages, and mail-servers, 
which relay messages along the transmission path. The protocol underlying email, SMTP, is characterised 
by intermediate storage, message queuing, delays, retransmission and delivery attempts.114 The 
transmission between intermediating mail-servers may be very fast or “almost instantaneous.” There is, 
however, no instantaneous transmission between the originating and the destination mail-clients: 
messages do not travel instantaneously from the computer of the sender to the computer of the 
addressee.115 Instantaneity can only refer to the speed of transmission between some of the relaying mail-
servers.  
 
Email communications are characterised by a number of inherent delays.116 The first occurs 
between the moment the message is composed on the mail-client and the moment it is dispatched from 
the outgoing mail-server. The dispatch from the mail-server onto the transmission path is periodic,117 
similar to placing a letter in a mailbox and subsequent collection by a postal employee. The second delay 
relates to the transmission process itself. The transmission may be delayed by network congestion or mail-
server unavailability. Although the transfer between the first and the last mail-server is unlikely to occur 
without any delay, such delay may in fact be minimal. The third delay takes place between the message 
entering the final mail-server and the moment it is accessed or retrieved by the addressee. It resembles 
the interval between placing the letter in the addressee’s mailbox and its subsequent retrieval.118 In the 
final step, mail-clients request (i.e. pull), messages from mail-servers.119 This operation is performed 
automatically, by configuring mail-clients to poll mail-servers at pre-determined intervals, or manually. 
Even with always-on broadband connections, retrieval occurs periodically: there is no permanent, open 
session between the mail-client and the incoming mail-server resulting in the immediate display of new 
messages.120 There is no direct client-to-client transmission of messages and all incoming messages must 
be requested and retrieved by mail-clients from mail-servers.121  
 
In light of the characteristics of the underlying protocols and its practical functioning it appears 
technically incorrect to call email instantaneous – at least with regards to communication.   
 
                                                
113 See also: B Wright, J K Winn, The Law of Electronic Commerce, Gaithersburg 1999, par 2.02; A Terret, I 
Monaghan, The Internet-An Introduction For Lawyers, p 25, in L Edwards, Ch Waelde ed., Law & the Internet, 
Oxford 2000; SMTP Internet Draft, Internet Mail Architecture (2005) D Crocker p 26: “Basic email transfer is 
accomplished with an asynchronous store-and-forward communication infrastructure, in a sequence of independent 
transmission through some number of MTSs.” 
114 RFC 2821, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (2001) J Klensin, ed, p 5, 10, 57 
115 Messages can travel from the sender’s mail-server to the addressee’s mail-server if they are in the same transport 
service environment, which is not the case if the parties communicate over an open electronic network; see: RFC 
2821, p 6 
116 J Hogan-Doran, above at note 14 at 384 
117 RFC 1123, Requirements for Internet Hosts – Application and Support (1989) R Braden, ed, p 58  
118 See: Toh See Kiat, Paperless International Trade: The Law of Telematic Data Exchange, Butterworths Asia, 
Singapore 1992 p 51 
119 Technologies like blackberry or so-called push-email, enable the “pushing” of messages to the terminating device. 
They rely on the classic architecture but interpose an additional server between the incoming mail-server and the 
end-user. The message is pushed to the terminating device because the addressee previously configured a server or 
device to do so.  
120 Commentators claiming that email is instantaneous may have been mislead by the speed of intra-company 
communications, when messages are transmitted within the same LAN. See: Fasciano, above at note 63 at 1001  
121 The purpose of this discussion is not establishing when receipt occurred but whether email is instantaneous. 
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Being “ in  contro l”   
 
The second argument against applying the PAR to email relates to “control.” The PAR assumes that upon 
posting the letter, senders lose control and are therefore not liable for subsequent events.122  If, however, 
senders retained control, there would be no justification for making acceptance effective on dispatch.123  
 
Treitel combines “control” with “instantaneousness”: the PAR cannot apply to instantaneous 
methods of communication because “the acceptor will often know at once that his attempt to 
communicate was unsuccessful.”124 Citing Entores and Brinkibon, he states that the sender is responsible 
to make a proper communication, “[b]ut a person who accepts by letter which goes astray may not know of 
the loss or delay until it is too late to make another communication.”125 As a result, “control” is tied to the 
ability to ensure or establish receipt,126 which in turn requires knowledge whether receipt occurred or not. 
It remains unclear whether such knowledge should relate to successful or to failed receipt. Ensuring 
receipt presumes notice of communication failure, whereas confirmation of receipt appears to be a 
question of proof and non-repudiation.127  
 
The key question in the control argument is: can receipt be determined without the addressee’s 
participation? This problem is illustrated in Lord Denning’s famous example of two clerks sending telex 
messages between offices in London and Manchester.128  It is usually overlooked that in his scenario both 
parties are present at their machines and that the addressee co-operates in ensuring receipt. Lord Denning 
insists that the sender knows - or has reason to know - that the acceptance has not been received. Lord 
Denning fails to note that once the message leaves the originating machine, the “reason to know” must be 
provided by the addressee. Addressees, however, may not be able to detect communication failures - even 
if they await acceptances.129 Even if they correctly maintain or attend the device, a problem may occur in 
the transmission channel. Accordingly, the addressee may not be aware of a communication attempt and 
will not inform the sender of the communication failure. Senders could learn of communication failures 
only if notifications to that effect were generated automatically, without the participation of the 
addressee. The “control” argument loses its validity when the sender’s knowledge of failed or successful 
receipt depends on the co-operation of the addressee. At this point, the reader might observe: “valid 
receipt can occur without the addressee’s presence at the machine.” This statement is true and the 
current discussion does not question its validity. It only asks whether the sender can establish the fact of 
receipt without the addressee’s participation. The sender may not be able to do so if the addressee is not 
present… 
 
The “control argument” relies on the ability to obtain confirmations of receipt or failure 
notifications.130 It is often claimed that in the case of email, the sender knows immediately whether a 
message has been received. This argument assumes that an inherent feature of email is the generation of 
                                                
122 Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216; see also: Chissick & Kelman 
p 79 
123 S Hill, above at note 45 at 17; Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 43 
per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton 
124 Treitel, above at note 75 p 26 
125 Treitel, above at note 75 p 26 
126 see: S Hill, above at note 45 at 25, Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 333; J Hogan-
Doran, above at note 15 at 381 
127 Ford, W, Baum, M S, Secure Electronic Commerce, Building the Infrastructure for Digital Signatures and 
Encryption, 2nd ed, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 2001  p 340, 341 for a discussion of non-repudiation of delivery and 
confirmation of receipt. 
128 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 333 
129 J D Gregory, Receiving Electronic Messages: Eastern Power v Azienda Communale Energia & Ambiente (1999-
2000) 15 BFLR 473 at 476 
130 see also: Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 224 
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acknowledgements of receipt or failure notifications. Do the relevant protocols attest to the veracity of 
this assumption?  
 
SMTP & Del ivery  Status  Not i f icat ions 
 
Theoretically, SMTP requires that the relevant mail-server or gateway issue a failure notification 
whenever a message cannot be delivered.131  An more detailed analysis of the protocol and its extensions 
reveals a more complex picture.132 Delivery Status Notifications (“DSN” or “notification,” popularly called 
“bounce message”) indicate conditions like: failed, delayed,133 or successful delivery, temporary failure134 It 
is, however, incorrect to assume that DSNs are always issued by the addressee’s mail-server or that 
notifications are generated automatically.  
 
First, a notification is not issued if it was not requested. Senders may not be able to issue such 
requests as their email applications or mail-servers may not provide this feature.  Second, the addressee’s 
mail-server may not support the generation of DSNs or may not be configured to do so. Technical 
capability must be distinguished from actual configuration. Notification requests may not be honoured.  
Furthermore, even if a mail-gateway supports the relevant SMTP extension, the mail system on the other 
side may not generate positive delivery notifications.135 A “relayed” notification is produced, indicating 
that no DSN can be sent. Moreover, SMTP does not always deliver the message to its final destination, 
i.e. the addressee’s mail-server. It may relay it into a different transport environment in which messages 
are no longer transported via SMTP. 136 Effectively, senders are informed that their message reached some 
point in the transmission channel and that no DSN can be issued. Third, notifications are generally not 
issued because of security reasons, as they enable the validation of hosts on a network and expose the 
mailbox to unsolicited messages (spam).  
 
Interesting situations arise when delay notifications are issued. While they may be obtained 
immediately after dispatch of the original message, the very notification informs that the message is 
delayed.137 DSNs may also be issued with substantial delay after the inability to deliver is discovered.138 
What is the status of an acceptance when a delivery failure notification arrives after 2 days? To 
complicate matters, Apple Mail offers a “bounce message” option, enabling recipients to return 
messages.139 Addressees can generate failure notifications and deny receipt in order to prevent the 
formation of a contract. Accordingly, the generation of DSNs depends on recipients acquiescing to 
requests for such notifications and on the technical ability of their systems to generate such.  For 
“knowledge of receipt” to support the control argument, all senders would have to be able to request and 
all delivering mail-servers or mail-clients would have to automatically, immediately and unconditionally 
generate notifications or confirmations.  
 
                                                
131 RFC 2821, pp 4, 61 
132 RFC 3461, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Service Extension for Delivery Status Notifications (DSNs) (2003) 
K Moore; RFC 3464, An Extensible Message Format for Delivery Status Notifications (2003) K Moore, G Vaudreuil; 
note that Delivery Status Notifications must be distinguished from Message Disposition Notification (“MDNs” or 
“read receipts”) which are sent by mail-clients or mail-gateways to report the disposition of a message after 
successful delivery. See RFC 3798 (2004) T Hansen, G Vaudreuil 
133  RFC 3461, p 6 
134 RFC 3461, p 21 
135 RFC 3464, p 21 
136 RFC 3464, p 16 
137Similar situations arise in the case of out-of-office replies, see: RFC 3834, Recommendation for Automatic 
Responses for Electronic Mail (2004) K Moore 
138 RFC 3461, p 14 
139 Apple Mail 1.3.11 (v622/623) 
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A final point in relation to the “control” argument: the purpose of the PAR was to prevent an ad 
infinitum exchange of confirmations of receipt. Introducing DSNs into the discussion creates the very 
situation the exception was designed to avoid. Apart from extending the contract formation process,140 
confirmations raise a number of additional problems.141 Absent prior agreement, recipients have no 
obligation to acknowledge receipt. They can speculate at the sender’s expense by refusing to confirm 
receipt of what would otherwise be a valid acceptance. What is the status of an “unconfirmed” 
acceptance? Depending on the answer to this question, effectiveness may shift to the moment of 
acknowledgement or create a state of uncertainty for both parties.142 In sum, confirmations distort the 
contract formation process and enable the manipulation of acceptance by delaying or refusing to 
acknowledge its receipt. Absent a general obligation – and a technical capability - to confirm receipt or 
notify of failed receipt on the addressee’s side, it cannot be assumed that acknowledgements or 
notifications are always issued. There is no universal rule that DSNs are generated whenever messages 
cannot be delivered. Due to increasing security concerns143 and differences between mail-clients and mail-
servers it is impossible to make this general assumption.144 It is therefore incorrect to claim that the sender 
of an email controls the communication process.  
 
 
RELIABILITY AND RISK ALLOCATION 
 
The two assumptions underlying arguments against extending the PAR to email (instantaneousness and 
control) depend on several technical factors. While it remains debatable whether email is instantaneous, it 
can be stated that senders are not in control of the communication process. It could therefore be claimed 
that the PAR should apply to email. Before settling on this conclusion it must be determined whether email 
resembles the post.145 The latter constitutes the default scenario for effectiveness on dispatch. A 
comparison with the post reveals that there are other factors, apart from “control” and “instantaneity,” 
that must be taken into account. 
 
Email and postal communications are structurally similar in the sequence of events: dispatch, 
transmission, intermediate storage and retrieval. Both are characterized by delayed access: an interval 
between the receipt of the message  (end of transmission), and its retrieval (notification).146 Both require 
the performance of an additional step to read the message or letter. The difference between them consists 
not only in the duration of transmission between the originating and the destination distribution platform – 
but also in their reliability. 
 
Reliability is a function of the risks inherent in the communication method and the ability to 
manage those risks. In the case of the post, the risk of receipt was placed on the offeror (addressee) 
because such risk was minimal. Does this allocation remain justified if the risk increases? The post is 
                                                
140 D Capps, above at note 109 at 207 
141 See: MLEC Art. 14, “Acknowledgement of receipt,” see also: Cheshire & Fifoot at [3.48]  
142 See: MLEC Art 14 (3): “where the originator has stated that the message is conditional on receipt of the 
acknowledgement, the data message is treated as though it has never been sent, until the acknowledgement is 
received”. Art 14 (4) deals with the situation where the originator has not stated that the message is conditional 
upon receipt of an acknowledgement. In the latter situation, he must perform a number of steps, such as requesting 
the other party to confirm within a specified time, before he can treat himself as relieved from the legal 
implications of his message, if any. See: official comment no. 96. 
143 mainly due the possibility of discovering hosts on the network, see: RFC 3834, Recommendations for Automatic 
Responses to Electronic Mail, K Moore (2004) p 15 
144 A R Chacker, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v Rio International Interlink (2003) 48 Vill L Rev 597 at 618 
145 Cheshire & Fifoot par 3.44, who state that electronic communications have some parallels with old-fashioned 
letters: “perhaps the postal rule will have a renaissance”; see also: Sh Christensen, above at note 111, who 
describes email as an “electronic version of the postal system.”  
146 S Hill, above at note 45 at 21 
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associated with reliability and a quality of service prescribed by statute.147 The number of reasons 
precluding an email from reaching the intended mail-server by far exceeds the number of reasons that 
might preclude a letter from reaching its destination mailbox.148 While transmission speeds and Internet 
accessibility increase, the reliability of email is decreasing.149  
 
 The more risks are involved in a specific method, the more important it is to establish rules of their 
allocation.150  The risk of failed communication can be borne by either the offeree (sender) or the offeror 
(addressee). Logically, these risks are non-existent in face-to-face dealings. Whereas the principle of 
receipt is not designed to allocate risks, the PAR was conceived to deal with situations where due to the 
reliability of the post those risks were minimal. Effectiveness on dispatch is fair to the offeror (addressee) 
if the method is reliable. It seems less fair to the offeror if the likelihood of receipt decreases. 
Effectiveness on receipt combined with unreliability is not fair to the offeree (addressee).  The only way to 
protect the latter is to require offerors to acknowledge receipt or notify of communication failures. This, 
however, leads to the very situation the PAR was designed to avoid: circular communications.151 It also 
requires that offerors be able to detect failed communication attempts and/or that their terminating 
devices automatically generate failure notifications. These technical requirements are, however, difficult 
to fulfil. Neither the principle nor the exception produces a fair result as neither accommodates a high risk 
of failed receipt. 
 
Common sense dictates that the time of formation cannot depend exclusively on the statistical 
probability of receipt or on the length of the interval between dispatch and receipt. This would imply that 
the longer the delay or the more reliable a method in terms of delivery statistics, the greater the 
justification for effectiveness on dispatch. The length of delay and delivery statistics are unpredictable and 
difficult to quantify. Both “reliability” and “instantaneity” constitute variable factors and necessitate the 
introduction of a gradation. Neither can form a decisive criterion for choosing between the principle and 
the exception. 
 
It remains questionable whether email is instantaneous. The sender of an email has no control 
over the communication process, unless a number of technical conditions are met. Although structurally 
similar to postal communications, email is not as reliable as the post and increases the need for 
acknowledgements of receipt and failure notifications.152 It is therefore difficult to decide whether it can 
be subsumed under the exception. How does it fit under the principle?   
 
                                                
147 see: Australia Post Annual Report 2004/05, p. 19, Reliable, on-time delivery is a regulated performance standard 
prescribed by the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989, section 28 (c). In 2004/2005 Australia Post delivered 
94.9 % of domestic letters on time or early - against the regulated 94 % target. "Of the letters that did not meet 
our timetable standard, nearly all were delivered by the following day." Independently monitored results show 
that 98.3 % of domestic letters were delivered on time or within one extra day. As was said by Lord Esher MR in 
Kemp v Wanklyn (1894) 1 QB 583, at p 585: "The Post Office is the authority which, under its statutory powers, 
determines the ordinary course of the post - that is to say, how the letters shall be carried, and at what time they 
shall, as a general rule, be delivered within any particular district to the persons taken as a body who reside in 
that district.” See also: Bowman v Durham Holdings Pty Ltd (1973) 131 CLR 8 at 13 
148 For a detailed description of what can go wrong see: RFC 3463 “Enhanced Mail System Status Codes” (2003) G 
Vaudreuil 
149 T Moors, Email Dependability, School of Electrical Engineering and Telecom, University of New South Wales, 
Australia, available at: www.eet.unsw.edu.au/∼timm; K Martin, The Time Has Come to Ditch Email, The Register, 
SecurityFocus Published 1st June 2006: “[E]mail is a terrible mess.  It's dangerous, insecure, unreliable, mostly 
unwanted and out-of-control.”available at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/06/01/ditch_email/print.html; J E 
Dunn, Yahoo accused of poor email service Tests find half its servers are shut down, Techworld 13 April 2006, 
available at www.techworld.com    
150 H B Thomsen, B S Wheble, Trading with EDI, The Legal Issues, London 1989, p 141 
151 Sh Christensen, Formation of Contracts by Email – Is it Just the Same as the Post? (2001) 1 QUTLJ 22 at 30 
152 Chissick, M, Kelmann, A, Electronic Commerce: Law and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000, p 80 
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DOES THE PRINCIPLE APPLY TO EMAIL? 
 
The principle of receipt derives from the paradigm situation of face-to-face dealings. Whenever the 
communication process displays the same characteristics as dealings between parties who transact in 
each other’s presence there is not justification to apply the exception.  
 
Face-to-face dealings ensure instantaneous communication: the manifestation of acceptance is 
concurrent with its notification. There is no delay between “dispatch and receipt” and between “receipt 
and notification.” The communication process is interactive: bi-directional, synchronous, imparting not only 
immediate knowledge of receipt but also ensuring a communication process without the dependencies 
inherent in dealings at a distance.153 Both parties monitor and control the communication process, neither 
requires protection from the possibility of failed receipt. This is illustrated by Lord Denning’s examples in 
Entores: shouting across the river, with planes passing overhead, and talking over the phone with the line 
going dead in the middle of the conversation.154 In both instances the “sender” knows of the 
miscommunication without the participation of the other party as communication failures become 
immediately apparent.  
 
Are email communications sufficiently similar to face-to-face dealings to apply the principle? On 
one hand, email can be compared to the post, the main similarity being the existence of intermediating 
distributing platforms, periodic transfer and the mechanics of message dispatch and retrieval. On the 
other, email does not involve a substantial delay between dispatch and receipt in the way the post does. 
Most importantly, if both parties attend their computers and regularly poll their mail-servers for new 
messages, they can exchange messages “as if” they were having a conversation. 
 
To answer the above question, the difference between “transmission and “communication” must 
be revisited and the two-way nature of face-to-face dealings must be taken into account. Again, the 
inconsistent use of terminology comes into play. 
 
 
T ransmiss ion and communicat ion 
 
Interactions over the phone are treated like face-to-face dealings.155 This, however, is justified only if both 
parties simultaneously use the device. When messages are left on answering machines, the 
communication process does not approximate the quality of face-to-face dealings.156 Communication is 
delayed due to the very fact that the other party is not present and accesses the message later.157 This 
important point was made by Coote as early as 1971. According to Coote, the mere use of an 
instantaneous mode of transmission is never decisive by itself. “It would always be necessary to know in 
addition whether the parties were thereby placed in instantaneous communication with each other.”158 In 
other words, methods providing instantaneous transmission need not provide instantaneous 
communication.  
                                                
153 “In a two-way communication, one party can determine readily whether the other party is aware of the first 
party’s communication, through immediate verbal response or, when the communication is face-to-face, there are 
nonverbal cues. When the communication is not instantaneous and is not face-to-face, there is much greater 
uncertainty as to whether the other party is aware of a particular transaction.” M S Baum, H H Perritt, Jr, Electronic 
Contracting, Publishing and EDI Law (1991) New York, p 321 
154 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 333, 334 
155 Aviet v Smith & Searle Pty Ltd (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 274;  Express Airways v Port Augusta Air Services [1980] Qd R 
543; W A Dewhurst & Co Pty Ltd v Cawrse [1960] VR 278 
156 H B Thomsen, B S Wheble, above at note 150, p 133 
157 R Nimmer, above at note 46 at 223, who implies that delayed access prevents to application of the face-to-face 
analogy. 
158 B Coote, above at note 11 at 342 
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Communication devices can be used in multiple ways. Devices that operate automatically (like 
telex) can be attended by both parties, rendering the communication process similar to face-to-face 
dealings. Devices like the telephone, which - by definition - presuppose the simultaneous presence of both 
parties, may also be used in a way that delays communication, e.g. when messages are left on the 
answering machine. Leaving aside the difference between instantaneous transmission and instantaneous 
communication, the above discussion also highlights the difficulties in deciding what “instantaneousness” 
should relate to: the method (or device?) of communication or the communication process itself. Coote’s 
argument seems to imply that various devices (method or means?) can bring about instantaneous 
communication but the device should not be regarded as the premise of instantaneousness. It is the actual 
exchange of manifestations of intention that must be instantaneous. Everything depends on how a device 
is used in a given communication scenario. 
 
In the case of email, instantaneousness relates to the speed of transmission to the addressee’s 
mail-server, it does not imply that the addressee immediately accesses or retrieves the message. When an 
emailed acceptance arrives at the mail-server, the addressee need not be present at his computer and the 
computer need not be on-line.159 Instantaneous communication is only possible if both parties attend their 
machines, maintain a permanent connection and regularly request messages from their respective mail-
servers.  
 
A further clarification is due. Unquestionably, receipt can occur outside of business hours or 
when the device is unattended or malfunctions.160 The present discussion, however, is not aimed at 
establishing when receipt occurs, but on determining when dealings at a distance can be equated with 
dealings face-to-face. The question is not: did receipt occur? The question is: which is the legally relevant 
event – dispatch or receipt? The latter question must be preceded with an analysis whether a given 
communication process resembles dealings face-to-face or those at a distance. If receipt is the legally 
relevant event, occurrences precluding receipt on the addressee’s side are disregarded. Receipt is either 
deemed or the addressee is estopped from denying it.161 If, however, acceptance is effective on dispatch, 
receipt becomes irrelevant altogether.  
 
 
Two-way 
 
Face-to-face dealings are characterized by their two-way nature. This is reflected in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts: “[a]cceptance given by telephone or other medium of substantially instantaneous 
two-way communication is governed by the principles applicable to acceptances where the parties are in 
the presence of each other.”162 “Substantial instantaneousness” requires transmission without any 
substantial lapse of time,163 “two-way,” an interaction among the parties, so that “ambiguities and 
misunderstandings, if perceived, can be cleared up on the spot.”164 Instantaneity is therefore only one of 
two necessary elements for the interactions to resemble face-to-face dealings. Despite the use of the term 
“medium” in relation to the telephone, it must be assumed that the Restatement refers to communication 
devices or methods in general.  
 
The Restatement applies the PAR to situations where the parties are not in each other’s presence 
and the method of communicating acceptance involves a delay between dispatch and receipt. As in the 
case of “control,” the two-way characteristic is tied to the possibility to obtain a confirmation of receipt or 
                                                
159 See: SMTP Internet Draft, Internet Mail Architecture (2005) D Crocker, p 3, 4 
160 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42 
161 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 333 
162 Restatement (Second) Contracts, Par 64 
163 Restatement (Second) Contracts, Par 64 comment a; see also: R Nimmer, above at note 46 at 222 
164 Restatement (Second) of Contracts Par 64 comment b 
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a failure notification.165 The restatement adopts the approach that the receipt rule should apply where the 
medium of communication is instantaneous and bi-directional, the postal exception - where 
communication is time-delayed and unidirectional.166   
 
This approach is also reflected in Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning in Entores, who mentioned 
telephone alongside radio communications, not telex.167 Although in the case of radio, the parties cannot 
speak simultaneously on the same channel, every disruption is detected immediately and a repeat can be 
requested while the communication is still in progress.168  In the case of e-mail, the sender does not know 
whether the message has been received.169 As with letters, there is no immediate feedback from the 
addressee.170 Technically, email is a one-way method of communication. The two-way characteristic can 
be “re-created” only if both parties attend their computers, regularly poll their mail-servers and 
automatically and immediately generate confirmations of receipt. As indicated above, the generation of 
such notifications presupposes certain technical capabilities of the addressee’s system and the 
addressee’s general willingness to co-operate, that is – communicate in real-time. The re-creation of the 
two-way quality may therefore not be possible.  
   
 
EMAIL COMPARED TO INSTANT MESSENGERS AND WEB-APPLICATIONS 
 
The difficulty in treating email communications at par with face-to-face dealings becomes even more 
apparent when email is compared to interactions via instant messengers (“IMs”) and web-applications.  
 
Instant  Messengers 
 
In principle, dealings via instant messengers occur in real-time as both parties must be on-line to 
exchange messages. Messages are typed and immediately appear on the screen, becoming visible to both 
parties at the same time.171 Dispatch and receipt are simultaneous, communication is instantaneous. Both 
parties monitor the communication process in real-time: if a message cannot be delivered, there is an 
immediate notification to that effect or the message does not appear on the screen. The communication 
process is interactive, instantaneous and two-way.172 Not only can senders ensure receipt, assuming that 
the immediate failure notification is interpreted as such, but also actual communication.  
 
Moreover, virtually all IM applications display so-called presence indicators, which inform 
whether a person is on-line, off-line, does not want to be disturbed etc. Status information indicates 
                                                
165 The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange – A Report and 
Model Trading Partner Agreement (1990)45 Bus Law 1645 [no page references available] 
166 Waddams, The Law of Contracts, (3rd ed., 1993) pp 73, 74; A A Macchione, Overview of the Law of Commercial 
Transactions and Information Exchanges in Cyberspace – Canadian Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives (1996) 
13 CIPR 129 at 133,134; see also Vocabulary of Terms for Broadband Aspects of ISDN, ITU-T Recommendation I.113 
(06/97) which distinguishes between conversational services and messaging services. The former are characterised 
by a bi-directional exchange by means of real-time (no store-and-forward) information transfer, whereas the latter 
offer communication via storage units with store-and-forward message handling. 
167 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 A C 34 at 41 
168 In the case of radio communication, which are technically one way at a time, custom has developed a distinctive 
way of communicating: every sequence of sentences after which a reply is expected is finished by the word ‘copy’ 
or “over’. Parties often re-confirm by “do you read me?” questions. 
169 Fasciano, above at note 63 at 1002 
170 It is therefore incorrect to assume that acknowledgements of receipt or failure notification can serve as a 
“substitute” for the two-way quality of interactions; see: Fasciano above at note 63 at 1002 
171 Differences of micro-seconds are disregarded. 
172 Ch P Morrison, Instant Messaging for Business: Legal Complications in Communication (2004) 24 J L & Com 141 at 
142, 143; see also: R Nimmer, above at note 46 at 222 
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whether a person can or desires to communicate.173 Some indicators change automatically, i.e. when a 
person is inactive for a predefined time the status turns to “idle” or “away,” others are changed manually, 
such as “do not disturb.” Senders can tailor their communication behaviour to the addressee’s presence 
information. To complicate matters, whenever an addressee is on-line then – irrespective of his status as 
“away,” “idle” or “busy” – some IM applications can still receive messages. “Away” does not necessarily 
imply that the addressee is “off-line.” As many computers remain on-line for months and parties do not 
log-off their IM applications, the “away” or “busy” status can be interpreted as an unwillingness to 
communicate. In other words, despite the technical ability to receive messages, the addressee’s status 
indicates delayed communication. Furthermore, some applications provide the option of “deliver now” or 
“deliver later” in the event the addressee is not online. Another variation is the possibility to send 
messages despite the addressee’s off-line status. Although a failure notification is displayed instantly, the 
message is delivered once the addressee returns on-line. In principle, senders know whether and when 
their messages are received and whether the addressee is on-line.174  
 
Despite the technical differences between email and instant messengers, either method can be 
used in ways resembling the other: email can be used to exchange messages in real-time, when both 
parties attend their computers, instant messengers can be used for delayed communications when 
senders type messages for later delivery. Despite such possibilities and the numerous permutations 
introduced by presence information, it can be assumed that as a general rule, instant messaging 
applications provide instantaneous two-way communication, whereas email is one-way and its 
instantaneous character depends on a number of variables, including the actual presence of both parties 
and the configuration of their mail-servers.  
 
Accordingly, email can be regarded as instantaneous in comparison to the post. It is not, in 
comparison to instant messengers. Its speed is relative and depends on what it is compared to. There are 
also two groups of users: those who are familiar with Internet-based communication methods and those 
who have acquired Internet skills later in life and are not comfortable with new technologies. The latter 
group perceives email as fast and essentially does not use instant messengers; the former regards email 
as slow and prefers instant messengers and text messaging.175 Taking into account today’s fast paced 
business environment, a delay of even five minutes may appear unacceptable to many.  
 
Web-based interact ions 
 
Web-based communications, due to the inherent immediacy of response, raise few problems with regards 
to effectiveness. The web was designed not as a method of communication but as a system of information 
retrieval. The interactivity of many websites is the result of applications running on the server- or client 
side. A distinction between downloading a website and interacting with a website must be made. 
“Downloading” consists of requests for a particular resource and a response in the form of delivery (i.e. 
display) of that resource.176 If the resource, generally in the form of a website, cannot be delivered, an 
error code is displayed. If the request in the form of typing in a URL or activating a link is treated as the 
dispatch of a message, then the response from the mail-server must be regarded as immediate. The 
process can be described as two-way: users requesting web-sites can monitor the responses from the 
                                                
173 See generally: RFC 2778, A Model for Presence and Instant Messaging (2000) M Day, J Rosenberg, H Sugano  
174 IM applications differ in their treatment of addressee inaction. A message may appear on the screen, no failure 
notification is issued - yet no reply from the addressee is forthcoming. Some IM applications display information 
when the other party is typing, others do not. Accordingly, absent failure notification the sender may not know why 
the addressee is not replying. The sender knows, however, that the message has been successfully delivered. 
Situations like these illustrate the inability to fully replicate the qualities of face-to-face dealings absent actual 
physical presence 
175 T Van Riper, Instant Messenger Etiquette, 08.22.06, available at www.forbes.com/2006/08/22/leadership-
bizbasics-messaging 
176 RFC 2616, Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1, R. Fielding et al., 1999; sections 1.4, 4.1,  
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web-server in real-time.177 Depending on the bandwidth, the requested resource “appears” on the screen 
with varying speed.  
 
In the case of server-side or client-side applications the process is not confined to information 
retrieval and bears signs of interactivity. Users not only request websites but provide input by filling out 
forms or clicking buttons thereby actively modifying the contents of websites displayed (i.e. sent) in 
response to their requests. Irrespective of whether user input is processed on the client- or on the server-
side, the response from the website can be monitored by the user in real-time. Although responses may be 
delayed by seconds, or even minutes in cases of server overload or slow connections, the interaction can 
still be described as instantaneous and two-way.  
 
A comparison of email, instant messengers and web-applications demonstrates the difficulty of 
subsuming all three under one rule. Divisions between the different communication methods do not fold 
neatly along technological lines. The only undisputed division is between dealings face-to-face and 
dealings at a distance. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Neither the principle nor the exception fit the new permutations introduced by email – speed of 
transmission coupled with unreliability and lack of control. The question “is email instantaneous?” dooms 
the outcome of any analysis and leads the argument into a blind alley. Email is “nothing by itself,” it can 
only enable a certain type of interaction. The “instantaneousness” of email is a logical shortcut that 
derives from an undisciplined and vague formulation of the principle. It must be admitted, however, that 
before the emergence of the current, more complex communication landscape, such logical shortcut was 
excusable. The “traditional” classification into “instantaneous” and “non-instantaneous” must therefore 
be abandoned. Speed alone is irrelevant. From businessmen with blackberries to schoolkids with mobile 
phones - everybody is “on-line” and wants to communicate in “real-time.” The instantaneity of 
transmission is taken for granted. The focus must be shifted from communication devices to the 
characteristics of the communication process. The latter resembles either dealings face-to-face or 
dealings at a distance. This simple division should constitute the starting point for all analyses.  Whenever 
the communication process is interactive and real-time, i.e. resembles face-to-face dealings, the 
application of the principle is unquestionable. The exception can only be debated in those instances where 
the exchange between the parties does not resemble face-to-face dealings.  
 
In light of the above, arguments based on the speed of transmission - or “instantaneousness” - 
must be retired from analyses of contract formation on-line. An additional factor, however, that may be 
included is “reliability.” The choice between the principle and the exception may be crucial not because of 
the length of delay between dispatch and receipt but because the increased risks of communication 
failure. Accordingly, the inquiry “when was the contract formed” turns into “who should bear the risk of 
failed receipt”? The “risk factor” was also explicitly mentioned by Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon.178 Placing 
the risk of receipt on the sender is unfair whenever receipt depends on the unpredictable workings of the 
transmission channel and the participation of the addressee. Placing the risk of receipt on the addressee is 
fair whenever the sender cannot guarantee receipt and the method of acceptance is imposed by 
addressee. As a result, an important consideration is the “reliability” of a given method as well as who 
imposed such method.  
 
It must not be forgotten that the method of acceptance is chosen with a specific communication 
goal in mind. If the offeror must be reached in real-time and communication must be ensured, the offeree 
                                                
177 J Hogan-Doran, above at note 14 at 384 
178 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42   
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will use the phone or an instant messaging application. As Internet-based technologies enable the 
detection of the offeror’s presence and communication status, offerees can tailor their response to this 
information. If an immediate response is required, it is questionable whether the offeree would email the 
acceptance. Again, the “communication goal” is closely related to the “reasonable expectations” of the 
parties mentioned by Lord Wilberforce.179 
 
It is impossible to state one universal rule encompassing all acceptances communicated via 
email. In principle, email does not provide a communication process resembling face-to-face dealings. An 
acceptance sent via email should not be effective on receipt but on dispatch.  At the same time, it is 
difficult to equate email with the post – at least in terms of reliability. One is therefore left with the 
necessity to examine each communication scenario involving an emailed acceptance on a case-by-case 
basis.  In the event, however, an acceptance is communicated by means of instant messengers or web-
based interactions it can be stated with confidence that there is no other option but effectiveness on 
receipt.  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                
179 Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42 
